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In the future, explicit use of the Mathews framework would help
clarify the Court's decisions in this area.
From the perspective of the Mathews test, it is clear that the
Schall majority erred in its assessment. The additional procedural
safeguards suggested for the detention statute by one judge - precise
evidentiary guidelines for the judges, limits on the types of crimes to
be predicted as well as those for which the arrested youth can be
subject to detention, and a speedy probable cause determination80 would not have transformed the family court into an adversarial
arena. Either an informal probable cause assessment 81 immediately
after arrest, or a mandatory determination at the initial appearance,
would satisfy constitutional requirements. When one considers other
factors in the Mathews test - the possibility of error and the importance of the individual interest at stake - the need for additional
82
safeguards appears compelling.
With its language about the limited liberty interests of juveniles
and professed faith in the unlimited discretion of juvenile court judges,
the Court in Schall has apparently erected at least a temporary barrier
to further expansion of constitutional protections for accused juvenile
offenders, At a broader level, the Court's willingness to ignore evidence of a statute's actual administration, and to defer to state judges
and legislators in this area, may be seen as part of a growing predilection on the part of the Justices to increase the discretion83 and
authority of state officials while relaxing procedural safeguards.
5. Right Against Self-Incrimination - "Public Safety" Exception.
In New York v. Quarles,' decided last Term, the Supreme Court
created a "public safety" exception to the famous rule of Miranda v.
Arizona 2 requiring police officers to advise suspects of their rights to
-

relate uniquely to the goals of the juvenile-court system"); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366
(970) (use of reasonable-doubt standard will have no "effect on the informality, flexibility, or
speed of the hearing"); id. at 375 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("It is of great importance . . .that
procedural strictures not ... jeopardize 'the essential elements of the State's purpose' in creating
juvenile courts." (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. i, 72 (1967) (Harlan, J.,concurring in part
and dissenting in part)).
80 See Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 377 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J.,concurring),
rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). Justice Marshall discussed these
additional safeguards in his Schall dissent. See 104 S. Ct. at 2431 & n.33 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
81In Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), the Court held that the constitutionally mandated
probable cause determination for adult detainees need only be "an informal procedure." See
id. at 120-25.
82 Perhaps this outcome explains why the Court, unlike Justice Marshall, steered clear of
explicit Mathews-style analysis despite its obvious suitability.
83 See, e.g., supra pp. io8-i8 (discussing good-faith exception to exclusionary rule); infra
PP. 140-51 (discussing "public safety" exception to Miranda requirements).
1 104 S. Ct. 2626 (1984).

2 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

1984]

THE SUPREME COURT, 1983 TERM

silence and counsel during custodial interrogation. 3 Although purporting not to repudiate Miranda,4 the Court avowedly struck a distinct balance between the interests of the public at large and those of
the arrested individual, and concluded that "overriding considerations
of public safety justify [an] officer's failure to provide Miranda warnings" before asking questions reasonably necessary to remove a threat
to public safety.5 In such circumstances, the responses so elicited will
later be admissible at trial.
At approximately 12:3o a.m. on September ii, I98O, a young
woman approached two policemen, Officers Kraft and Scarring, while
they were on road patrol in Queens, New York. She told them that
she had just been raped and that her assailant was armed and had
entered a nearby supermarket. Kraft entered the store and spotted
the respondent Quarles, who matched the woman's description. He
pursued the suspect to the rear of the store, and after three other
officers had arrived on the scene, Kraft frisked him, discovered an
empty shoulder holster, and handcuffed him. Before apprising
Quarles of his Miranda rights, Kraft asked him, "Where is the gun?"
Looking toward a stack of empty cartons, Quarles answered, "The
gun is over there." After recovering a loaded revolver, the police read
the suspect his rights. 6 In the later prosecution for criminal possession
of a weapon, 7 the trial court excluded both Quarles's statement and
the handgun because the police had failed to read the defendant his
rights before obtaining this evidence. The Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court of New York 8 and the New York Court of Appeals 9
affirmed the suppression order.
The Supreme Court reversed. In an opinion written by Justice
Rehnquist and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White,
Blackmun, and Powell, the Court held that "there is a 'public safety'
3 "Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent,
that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right
to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
4 "[Wie do not believe," the Court stated, "that the doctrinal underpinnings of Miranda
require that it be applied in all its rigor to [this] situation ... " Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2632.
5 Id. at 2629.
6 The majority and the dissent recounted substantially the same events except that the dissent
noted that the other officers trained their weapons on Quarles during the frisking. See id. at
2629-30; id. at 2642 (Marshall, J., dissenting). After receiving his Miranda warnings, Quarles
indicated that he was willing to answer questions without an attorney present and that he
owned the revolver and had purchased it in Miami, Florida. See 104 S. Ct. at 2630. The
Quarles opinions do not join issue over these later statements: finding an exception for the gun
and initial statement, the majority consequently admitted the later utterances, see id. at 2634,
but the opinions of Justices Marshall and O'Connor contain no conclusion about their admissibility, see id. at 2634 n.i (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
7 The record fails to explain why the State of New York decided not to prosecute the alleged
rape. See 104 S. Ct. at 2630 n. 2.
8 People v. Quarles, 85 A.D.2d 936, 447 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1981) (mem.).
9 People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 444 N.E.2d 984, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520 (1982).
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exception to the requirement that Miranda warnings be given before
a suspect's answers may be admitted into evidence." 10 The opinion
insisted first that the warnings are not themselves constitutional rights
but merely "prophylactic" measures that provide "practical reinforcement" for the right against self-incrimination of the fifth and fourteenth amendments - measures required by the Miranda Court's
presumption that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive. 1 1 The
Quarles opinion noted the Miranda Court's belief that these warnings
would reduce the likelihood of coercion, but also recognized the cost
imposed on the public by the rule: the officer's recitation of the warnings might deter suspects from answering questions, and this in turn
might lead to fewer convictions of guilty suspects. 12 The Court did
not challenge what it understood to be the Miranda majority's view:
that this cost is in general outweighed by the additional protection of
rights bought by those warnings.
The Quarles Court did insist, however, that the social cost of the
Mirandawarnings is higher when the police officer's recitation of them
might deter a suspect from responding to questions that are necessary
to avert an immediate threat to the public safety, such as the concealment of a loose gun somewhere in a supermarket. 13 In the Court's
view, when answers are not actually coerced - and the record contained no claim that Quarles's were - this higher social cost outweighs
the need for the Miranda safeguards. In such exigent circumstances,
the Court explained, evidence obtained without warnings must be
admissible in order to save individual officers from the dilemma of
having to choose between giving the warnings at the risk that public
safety will be jeopardized and withholding the warnings at the risk
that probative evidence will be excluded. 14 And although the Court
expressed a belief that the good instincts of police officers will ensure
accurate application of the exception,' 5 the application does not depend on the actual motivation of the officers involved. 16 Rather,
informal questioning need only be "reasonably prompted by a concern
17
for the public safety."'
Justice O'Connor, writing alone, concurred in the part of the
Court's opinion that reversed the decision to exclude the revolver, but
dissented from the Court's holding on the admissibility of Quarles's
10 1o4 S. Ct. at 2632.
1 Id. at 2631.

12 Id. at 2632.
13 "[A]n accomplice might make use of [the gun, or] a customer or employee might later
come upon it." Id.
14 See
15 See
16 Id.
17 Id.
p. 148.

id. at 2633.
id.

at 2632.
For a fuller exposition of the Court's position on the significance of motivation, see
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initial statement. The majority, she explained, misunderstood the
"critical question" addressed by Miranda. Miranda had not prohibited the police from asking questions to secure the public safety. It
had merely determined that when such questions are asked and answered before proper warnings have been given, the state and not the
defendant must bear the cost of securing the public safety; the answers
must therefore be inadmissible.' 8 In Justice O'Connor's view, the
Miranda Court, "for better or worse," had found that result "implicit
in the prohibition against compulsory self-incrimination."' 19 She also
criticized the Court's new exception for blurring the clear lines of the
Miranda rule: police will suffer when reviewing courts disagree with
their assessments of "'objective' circumstances" and so suppress probative evidence; the "end result," she predicted, "will be a finespun
new doctrine . . .[of] hair-splitting distinctions." ' 20 Justice O'Connor
would, however, have admitted the gun as nontestimonial evidence
because "[t]he harm caused by failure to administer Miranda' 2warnings
1
relates only to admission of testimonial self-incriminations."
Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens, dissented from all the majority's conclusions. First, he criticized the
majority for misusing the facts in order to find a threat to public
safety. The lower courts had found no subjective belief by the officers
in, and no objective facts to establish, a danger to the public or to
the police officers. 22 Observing that two appellate courts - the Supreme Court and the New York Court of Appeals - had reached
opposite conclusions on the same facts, Justice Marshall warned of
the confusion that the new "public safety" exception would engender
23
among courts and police.
More fundamentally, however, the dissent disagreed with the majority's basic claim that a "public safety" exception is consistent with
Miranda. Justice Marshall understood Miranda not to rest on a bal18 See id. at 2636 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
IQ Id. at 2634-36. "[F]rom a clean slate," Justice O'Connor might have been inclined to join

the Court's full opinion. Id. at 2634. In her view, however, Miranda "is now the law," and
the majority did not provide sufficient justification to depart from that decision's "literal terms."
Id. at 2634-35.
20 Id. at 2636.
21 Id. at 2639. Thus, according to Justice O'Connor, when police coercion produces both
testimonial and nontestimonial evidence, Miranda's concerns are satisfied if the nontestimonial
evidence alone is admitted. See id. at 2638. Justice O'Connor also suggested that uncoerced
statements elicited by police in violation of Miranda are less sympathetic bases for a broad
suppression ruling than are statements made under the threat of contempt in a judicial proceeding. Because earlier derivative-evidence cases under the fifth amendment involved the latter
kind of statements only, she would have applied the derivative-evidence principles more restrictively in Quarles. See id. at 2639-40. For an analysis of this view, see note 51.
2Z See 104 S. Ct. at 2642-43 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "The police could easily have
cordoned off the store and searched for the missing gun." Id. at 2643.
23 See id. at 2644-45.
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ancing of costs and benefits, and thus he denied that the majority's
introduction of "public safety" considerations into fifth amendment
jurisprudence was simply an adaptation of the Miranda analysis to a
particular situation. Rather, the Miranda Court, in seeking to deal
with the "practical problems" of determining when a confession is
unconstitutionally compelled, had created a "constitutional presumption" that statements made during custodial interrogation are compelled. Questions asked to secure the public safety are "no less inherently coercive" than any other kind of questions and so should be
no less subject to the constitutional presumption. 24 Indeed, the dissent
insisted that the majority's central premise was that "public safety"
questioning is and should be coercive: the majority feared that if the
suspect were apprised of his rights, he might actually use them by
refusing to respond. 25 On the particular facts at hand, moreover, the
dissent concluded that the interrogation of Quarles was coercive in
fact, and that the public safety exception thus should not have been
triggered even under the majority's standard. 26 Finally, the dissent
declined to consider what it described as Justice O'Connor's "novel
theory"'27 on derivative evidence and called for a remand to consider
28
the admissibility of the gun.

The Quarles opinions, like Miranda itself, recognize that both the
coercion felt by a suspect and the motives harbored by a police officer
amid the "kaleidoscopic" events of arrest and custodial interrogation
may be unknowable or unprovable in a post hoc hearing. 29 The
opinions represent compromises with these limits of human knowledge, efforts to rest with comfort on the dark side of the veil drawn
across human motivation. Because such motivation cannot be known,
the opinions all are based on presumptions about states of mind. But
the compromise reached by the majority in Miranda differs radically
from that reached by the majority in Quarles and comes from a very
different source of inspiration. At least initially, the Miranda compromise seems more consonant with the rest of American jurisprudence.
In certain contexts, the meaning of the constitutional concept
"compulsion" and its presence or absence seem clear. For example,
Id. at 2645-47.
See id. at 2647. In this sense, the new exception offends not only the prophylactic
Miranda requirements but also the fifth amendment's absolute prohibition "simply by calculating
special costs that arise when the public's safety is at issue." Id. at 2649.
26 See id. at 2647.
27 Id. at 2649 n.ii.
28 The dissent would have remanded the case for the trial court to determine whether New
York law would allow the application of the newly announced "inevitable discovery" rule of
Nix v. Williams, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984), and if so, whether the the gun would in fact have
inevitably been discovered. See 1o4 S. Ct. at 2649 & n.xx, 265o & n.12 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
29 See Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2646 (Marshall, J. dissenting); 104 S. Ct. at 2632 (motives of
police officer); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457, 469 (1966) (coercion of defendant).
24
25
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"compulsion" may be clear when defined as the product of an investigative process marked by specific practices widely perceived to be
objectionable. The privilege against self-incrimination arose in reaction to such processes, 30 and the Supreme Court in the last century
has readily found violations of the fifth amendment when the contempt
power, 3 1 torture, or prolonged sequestration 32 have been used to obtain confessions. Alternatively, the fifth amendment seems to speak
of "compulsion" as actual subjective coercion. 33 The presence or
absence of this kind of compulsion might be clear to citizens such as
those in the foreground of the portrait of American life implicit in the
Constitution: propertied citizens relatively equal in power and judges
who are similarly situated, all sharing the experience of a felt, discernible sphere of voluntary action and independence in their own
affairs. 3 4 If modern American society were composed of individuals
with such shared emotional referents, the task of determining when a
free will was subjectively overborne might be relatively easy for them
35
- as perhaps it may have been for their historical counterparts.
In modern America, however, distinguishing subjective "coercion"
from other feelings of pressure has, as a factual and legal matter,
become immeasurably more difficult. On a factual level, the relatively
homogeneous society of independent equals 3 6 sketched in the Constitution has given way to a society both more stratified and more
complex. As a result, some groups, such as the poor and certain
minorities, may feel especially distant from power. 37 More generally,
30 See Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. I, 1-23 (I949);

Pittman, The Colonialand ConstitutionalHistory of the Privilege Against Self-Incriminationin
America, 21 VA. L. REv. 763, 769-83 (I935).
31 See, e.g., Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964) (proscribing "the cruel
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt").
32 See, e.g., Chambers v. Florida, 3"09 U.S. 227 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278

(1936); Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924).
33 Presumably, this is why Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor assume that the fifth amendment
itself proscribes only actual subjective coercion. See supra p. 142.
34 This rendition of the suppositions about society evident in the Constitution is, of course,
not uncontroverted. It is, however, a common rendition.
35 "[Tlhe keen and doughty [colonial] defendants were not one whit less skillful than the
best of their prototypes in similar situations in England." Morgan, supra note 30, at ig.
36 Because the Constitution's protection originally extended only to a small fraction of the
population, see, e.g., M. WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 258-67
(1978), this homogeneity may have been artificial; but that fact is irrelevant to the ease with
which coercion may have been determined.
37 See Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 238 (1940) ("And they who have suffered most

from secret and dictatorial proceedings have almost always been the poor, the ignorant, the
numerically weak, the friendless, and the powerless."); Z. CHAFEE, W. POLLAK & C. STERN',
REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 159 (1931) (observing that police brutality

is directed especially against blacks and the poor); Driver, Confessions and the Social Psychology
of Coercion, 82 HARV. L. REv. 42, 47-48 (1968) (arguing that low-status persons are especially
susceptible to coercion in interrogation). See generally Bullough, Alienation in the Ghetto, 72
Am,. J. SoC. 469 (x967) (describing conditions of alienation in inner-city ghettos).
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the rise of the professional police force and a mass society perceived
to be dominated by big government may cause many citizens to feel
a lack of control, to varying degrees, in all dealings with the govern-

ment. 38 Yet most judges are removed from such feelings of powerlessness as a result of their magistracy over the police. Thus, even if

a broad social consensus existed regarding the legal meaning of "voluntariness," judges would largely be ill-equipped to empathize with

those less secure citizens whose subjective sense of "voluntariness" in
dealings with the government is both narrow and dim.

But in any event, "voluntariness" does not seem to have a functional legal definition. The decisions talismanically intone that pressure that "overbears" a "free will" "under the totality of the circumstances" offends the Constitution. 39 No definition of these terms is
available from abstract philosophy; the problems of free will and
determinism have plagued the Western intellectual tradition for millennia, and no general agreement on them seems forthcoming. Moreover, as suggested earlier, modern American society lacks shared emotional referents to substitute for philosophical conclusions. Fifth
amendment "voluntariness" thus remains a metaphysically indeterminate legal concept: typically, a divided Court recites the standard
40
and the facts and then announces conflicting findings.
38 For empirical analyses of the great variety of social and psychological pressures that
suspects feel during interrogation, see Driver, supra note 37, at 56-59, and Griffiths & Ayres,
A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogationof Draft Protestors, 77 YALE L.J. 300, 31218 (1967). For empirical analyses of why even warnings standing alone are inadequate to
overcome these pressures, see Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander, Custodial Police Interrogation in
Our Nation's Capital: The Attempt to Implement Miranda, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1347, 1370-79,
1396-98 (1968); Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519,
1562-78, 1613-14 (1967); and Griffiths & Ayres, supra, at 312-I8.
39 "Voluntariness" has functioned as shorthand for two other concepts: the "untrustworthiness" of coerced confessions, see, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722 (1975); Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 507 (1966); Paulsen,
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6 STAN. L. REv. 411, 414-17 (1954), and
the "abusiveness" of certain police practices, see, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626,
2635 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 507;
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 153-55 (I944); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 23740 (1940); Paulsen, supra, at 17-23. But "voluntariness" in the sense of an actual exercise of
free will also stands on its own bottom - although typically accompanied by reference to
abusive practices - as a third strain in the cases. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S.
450, 459 (I979); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978); United States v. Washington,
431 U.S. 181, 187 (I977); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963); Townsend v. Sain,
372 U.S. 293, 307 (1963); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440 (i961); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S.
56o, 566-67 (958).
On the other hand, pressure that does not overbear a free will is not
unconstitutional: the cases are quick to point out, for example, that all supects in custody feel
some pressure to confess. See, e.g., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1975).
40 See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 407-o8 (978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (terming confession voluntary even though defendant was "seriously
wounded and laden down with medical equipment, . . . not able to move about and, because
of the breathing tube in his mouth, had to answer Detective Hust's questions on paper"); Haynes
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Viewed from this perspective, the crucial issue in Miranda was
not the meaning of coercion but what the judge should do when he
cannot confidently determine whether a defendant subjectively experienced coercion in a particular circumstance. The Miranda Court
mandated its famous warnings because modern custodial interrogation
"contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist" 41 - psychological pressures that are
often very subtle. 4 2 As each of the Quarles opinions explains, the
Court in Miranda insisted that the presumption of43 coercion absent
these warnings does not depend on particular facts:
[W]e will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information
as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities,
can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact.
More important, whatever the background of the person interrogated,
a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome
knows he is free to
its pressures and to insure that the individual
44
exercise the privilege at that point in time.
Thus, the Miranda compromise is clear: in the face of inevitable
ignorance about volition, courts must presume that all interrogations
45
are coercive unless the prescribed warnings are given.
The Quarles Court reached a very different compromise. The
majority was careful to insist that the record contained no charge of
actual coercion but only of a Mirandaviolation; even in cases involving a threat to public safety, it held, a showing of actual coercion
v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49 (1962); Reck v. Pate,
367 U.S. 433 (1961); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 56o (1958); Kamisar, A Dissent from the
Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness"
Test, 65 MICH. L. Rgv. 59, 94-104 (1966); Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure,
70 HARV. L. REv. 1, 7 (1956); see also Driver, supra note 37, at 49 (sociologists are unable to
predict the sensation of pressure from objective information because of the number and complexity of variables); Elsen & Rosett, Protectionsfor the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 645, 658 (2967) (arguing that when voluntariness of Miranda waiver is
contested, "reality is wholly indeterminate and both versions may well be true").
41 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
42 See id. at 445-58.
43 See 104 S. Ct. at 2631; id. at 2635 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); id. at 2647 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
44 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69 (citation omitted).
45 This analysis has been the most common interpretation of Miranda; the warnings are
merely "prophylactic." See, e.g., Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2631; id. at 2635 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2647 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting); New Jersey
v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 99-2oo (i975); Harris
v. New York, 402 U.S. 222, 224 (1971); Elsen & Rosett, supra note 40, at 647-49. Portions of

the Miranda opinion, however, suggest a holding that custodial interrogation is per se merely presumptively - coercive. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458, 462.

not
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warrants exclusion of evidence. 46 These five Justices are apparently
confident that coercion can be shown in every case in which constitutional rights need to be protected, and thus they deem it fair to
demand evidence of actual coercion in individual cases. Yet as the
other two opinions point out, 47 the recognition from which Miranda's
presumption springs - that the human mind is ultimately impenetrable - pertains as much to questions involving public safety as to
48
any others.
After appearing to spurn the recognition underlying Miranda, the
Court reversed its premises when addressing the problem of police
motivation. Having suggested that a suspect's psychological experience can be determined after the fact, it proceeded to assume that the
motivations of police officers cannot be so determined, or at least
determined with enough certainty to ensure a broad application of the
new exception:

[T]he application of the exception . . .should not be made to depend
on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective
motivation of the arresting officer. . . . [M]ost police officers . . .
would act out of a host of different, instinctive, and largely unverifiable motives - their own safety, the safety of others, and perhaps as
well the desire to obtain incriminating evidence ....49
After acknowledging that these motivations are unknowable, the
Court was nevertheless quick to paint a warm-toned picture of faithful
and intelligent officers in order to dispel any worry about inaccurate
or abusive application of the exception: "We think police officers can
and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary
to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions
0
designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect."5
In this sense, Quarles's epistemological structure parallels Miranda's but with radically different components: under Quarles, the good
faith motivation of the police officer is to be presumed in order to
avoid too limited an application of the public safety exception, just
as under Miranda, the coercion of the defendant is to be presumed
in order to avoid too limited an application of the fifth amendment.5 1
46 See 104 S. Ct. at 2631 & n.5, 2633 n.7.

47 See id. at 2636 (O'Connor, J.,concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2649
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
48 Quarles nowhere confronts this conflict with Miranda, largely because it nowhere attempts
an explanation of why that case required warnings. The opinion does suggest that the Miranda
Court believed that warnings would "reduce the likelihood" of fifth amendment violations, 104
S. Ct. at 2632, but fails to specify why that fact should lead to a constitutional requirement of
warnings.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 2633.
51 Under the same line of analysis, Justice O'Connor's opinion is also in conflict with Miranda
and internally inconsistent. Justice O'Connor purports to adhere to the earlier case and would
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The two cases thus track two very different portraits of society. Miranda contemplates a victim in need of warnings and a police officer
in need of restraint. 52 Quarles envisions an officer acting in good faith
and a criminal suspect who has not been coerced until he convinces
the court otherwise. And although the last presumption is theoretically rebuttable, Quarles has shifted to the suspect the risk that sub53
jective states of mind cannot be objectively determined.
Whether or not one regards Quarles as a contradiction of specific
precedent, the question remains whether its conclusion or Miranda's
is the more warranted. As previously argued, the coercion - or lack

of it -

that a suspect feels during custodial interrogation is largely

unknowable.

Miranda forthrightly draws this conclusion.

Quarles

does not, yet the conclusion seems latent in aspects of the majority's
opinion. The opinion nowhere explains why during "kaleidoscopic"
situations such as arrests, the mental states of criminal -suspects can
be better known than those of police officers. Similarly, the majority
nowhere explains why a desire "to obtain incriminating evidence"
should be harder to detect than so metaphysical a notion as a "will

overborne."

The Court, then, cannot but rely on presumptions in

painting its constitutional canvas.

To complete what is essentially a portrait from ignorance, the
Court must draw on a legitimate source of inspiration. In Quarles

and Miranda, the Court appeals to two distinct sets of values. 54
Quarles implicitly invokes the importance of preserving the public

exclude the statement, yet she would not exclude the gun because it is only nontestimonial
evidence "derived not from actual compulsion but from a statement taken in the absence of
Miranda warnings." Id. at 2640 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But
Miranda equated a confession made in the absence of warnings with a coerced one because of
the dangers of judicial ignorance and did not admit of the possibility of knowing of an uncoerced
admission made after interrogation without warnings.
52 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445-58 (description of manipulative police practices); id. passim
(repeated incantatory assertion of the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation).
53 Legally, of course, the subjective experience only of the suspect and not of the officer is
relevant to the issue of coercion, and the majority would doubtless insist that factual establishment of the officer's good faith is less important than proof of coercion because they hold only
that the objective need not to give warnings in certain situations outweighs the need to do so.
But although motivation of police officers may not be directly relevant legally, it certainly is
relevant to the Court's rationale: in its balancing, the Court presumes police officers who act in
good faith and suspects who are not coerced, and thus shifts the burden of the risk of limited
knowledge.
54 Certain other obvious sources of inspiration are inadequate. The literal language of the
fifth amendment will not suffice because it proscribes "compulsion" as a factual matter precisely the difficulty. Alternatively, the Court could look to systematic probabilities. Yet
although Miranda refers to police manuals and Quarles to a faith in police instincts, neither
pretends to cite actual empirical studies, and for good reason: the studies are imperfect, see,
e.g., Interrogations in New Haven, supra note 38, at 153o-33; Medalie, Zeitz & Alexander,
supra note 38, at 1355-6o, the exact probabilities may shift frequently; and in any event, the
numbers alone prescribe neither a legal definition of coercion nor the legal consequences to be
drawn from a given probability.
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safety to justify laying the risk of ignorance on the suspect. Miranda,
by contrast, explicitly looks to the place of the fifth amendment in
American law:5 5 it insists that the right against compulsory self-in'5 6
crimination is "fundamental to our system of constitutional rule."
As a result, police officers must as a rule employ objective procedural
safeguards in order to ensure the prophylactic protection of the values
that the Miranda Court saw as the underpinnings of the fifth amendment: the dignity of the individual and his right to a sphere of felt
independence from the government. If the police fail to employ such
safeguards, systematically doubtful questions of motivation must be
resolved in favor of protecting the suspect's fifth amendment right,
57
rather than in favor of enforcing less fundamental criminal laws.
The Miranda approach seems more in line with traditional American jurisprudence. The Constitution is technically sovereign law only
in the sense that its precise directives take precedence over other laws;
but because of its primacy, it is also more significant than those other
laws to the resolution of collateral issues such as presumptions of
motivation. The Miranda holding, moreover, is part of an AngloAmerican tradition of translating the right against coerced self-incrimination from subjective terms into objective procedural protections.5 8
This translation has accompanied the further tendency of fifth amendment jurisprudence to focus on particular historical practices, rather
than on investigation into the nature of the will as understood at any
given time.5 9 Most important, the Miranda Court looked to the values
that it considered basic to the governing constitutional provision -60
the dignity of the individual, the right to autonomy from the state
- in order to develop its presumptions about motivation. It did not
look, as the Quarles majority did, to extraconstitutional considerations
- such as faith in the rectitude of government officials 6 ' - that are
directly inimical to the spirit of the fifth amendment.
55 This may be what the dissent in Quarles means when it calls the Miranda rule a
"constitutional presumption": it is drawn from values contained in the Constitution and thus is
given full constitutional force.
s6 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
s See id. at 46o.
58 See, e.g., id. at 486-87 (discussing English Judges' Rules); Kamisar, supra note 4o, at
73-75 (noting that the 1849 Code of Criminal Procedure submitted by the New York Commissioners on Practice and Pleading recommended warnings for reasons virtually identical to some
of those offered in Miranda); sources cited supra note 30 (privilege against self-incrimination
arose as a bar to certain procedural abuses).
59 See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458-66; id. at 526-27 (White, J., dissenting); Ullmann
v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956) ("The privilege against self-incrimination is a specific
provision of which it is peculiarly true that 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic."'); id.
at 446-53 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 237-38 (1940).
60 See supra p. iSo.
61 See Ullmann, 350 U.S. at 428 ("Having had much experience with a tendency in human
nature to abuse power, the Founders sought to close the doors against like future abuses by
law-enforcing agencies."); Chambers, 309 U.S. at 241 ("Today, as in ages past, we are not
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Unfortunately, the argument sketched here may remain undevel-

oped because the majority never explicitly considered any of the risks
of limited knowledge as they relate to defendants and so never invited

discussion of the question. The Court insisted that it was balancing
not a constitutional right, but only a subordinate judicial creation

called "Mirandarights." 6 2 This sleight of hand conceals the real issue:
if motivation in "spontaneous" moments is - in the majority's own
words - "largely unverifiable," what set of values is fundamental
enough to serve as a surrogate for a factual determination of coercion?
Although Quarles implicitly acknowledges the necessity of answering

the question, it attempts no explicit answer. Yet if the Miranda
conclusion is the right one, then the majority has balanced away real
fifth amendment rights, which even the majority implicitly conceded
cannot be balanced. 63 The majority comforted itself with its own

canvas of presumptions -

one in which a confession, albeit in vio-

lation of Miranda, is not unconstitutionally coerced. But in claiming

that it is only an observer and not the creator of that canvas, the
Court obscures the fact that it has chosen to favor ensuring successful

prosecutions over ensuring constitutional rights.
6. Rights of Prisoners and PretrialDetainees. - In 1979, in Bell
v. Wolfish,' the Supreme Court rejected constitutional attacks on various jail policies involving the treatment of pretrial detainees. 2 The
Wolfish Court affirmed that incarcerated persons retain certain constitutional rights, 3 but held that courts examining detainees' claims
must accord administrators of correctional institutions "wide-ranging
deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that
without tragic proof that the exalted power of some governments to punish manufactured crime
dictatorially is the handmaid of tyranny. Under our constitutional system, courts stand against
any winds that blow as havens of refuge for those who might otherwise suffer because they are
helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because they are non-conforming victims of prejudice and
public excitement.").
62 See 104 S. Ct. at 2631 & n.5.

63 See id. at 2631 n.5; see also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459 (1979) ("Balancing
[the fifth amendment] . . . is impermissible."). Even if the Court were to hold that fifth
amendment rights can be balanced, conventional constitutional analysis suggests that the public
interest on the other side of the scale would have to be "compelling" or at least "substantial"
to be "overriding." To find such an interest on the facts of Quarles, the majority would have
had to insist - in the absence of any such finding below - not only that the gun created a
substantial or compelling danger, but also that the alternative - excluding the evidence at the
risk of losing the misdemeanor conviction of a defendant who could presumably also be prosecuted for rape - also created such a danger.
1 441 U.S. 520 (i979).

2 See id. at 533-61.
3 See id. at 545. In the 1974 case of Wolff
forcefully disavowed the so-called "hands off"
federal courts to deny jurisdiction over claims
stated that "though [a prisoner's] rights may be

v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), the Court
attitude that had traditionally led state and
involving prison conditions. The Wolff Court
diminished by the needs and exigencies of the

